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a safer position ; to the distinctness, cer-
tainty and extent, or degree of the peril,
and so on." "May the ordinary per-
son," said the-court, " with his eyes open
and with abundant accommodations be-
fore him, which are safe, accept an invi-
tation from the carrier to ride on the
cow-catcher, and then, if injury arises
from it, be allowed to set up the invi-
tation as a legal answer to the charge
of contributory negligence? Toconclude
that he might would be to permit a per-
son of full capacity to exempt himself
from the duty and responsibility apper-
taining to him as a moral being, and in
substance to stultify himself in order to
cast a liability on another." Judges
cannot denude themselves of the knowl-
edge of the incidents of railway travel-
ling, which is common to us all :" Lake
:5hore 4- Mich. Rd. v. Miller, 25 Mich.
274 ; Sinerv. Great Western Rd., L. R.,
4 Ex. 123 ; Dublin, Wicklow - Wexord
Rd. v. Slattery, 3 App. Cases 1155 ; s.
c. 10 Ir. Rep. 256: 24 Eng. 713.
If the passenger sits on the steps of
the front platform, against the warning
of the conductor, without making an
effort to secure himself by holding on to
the railing, he will be deemed guilty of
contributory negligence, and cannot re-
cover, if injured: Wills v- Lynn 4- Bos-
ton Rd., 129 Mass. 351.
"In Ward v. Central Park Rd., 33 N. Y.
392; s. c. 11 Abb. Prae. Rep. (N. S.)
411 s. c. 42 How. Pr. 289, the plain-
tiff was standing on the edge of the
rear platform of the defendant's car; and
was thrown off and injured. He made
no effort to hold on. JHe was not per-
mitted to recover.
The recent case of Heckrott v. Buffalo
St. Rd., Superior Ct. Buffalo, 13 Am.
Law Record 295, is interesting, and con-
tains a thorough review of the cases.
Here the plaintiff took passage on the
defendants' car, he standing on the front
platform, with his foot on the iron rod
near the dash-rail, and his back against
the window, from which position he fell
off the car and was injured. In an ac-
tion against the company it was held
that he could notrecover, as his situation
was the proximate cause of the injury.
B. E. BLACx.
San Jose, Cal.
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SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.
1
COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF MARYLAND.
2
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY.
3
SUPREME COURT OF VERMONT.
4
SUPREME COURT OF WISC6NSIN. 5
ACTION. See .rusband and Wife.
AGENT. See Insurance.
Illegal Transacton-Estopp.le-An agent who receives money for his
principal upon a contract not criminal or immoral in its character, but
, From Hon. N. L. Freeman, Reporter; to appear in 113 Ill. Rep.
2 From J. Shaaff Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 63 Md. Rep.
3 From G. D. W. Vroom, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 18 Vroom.
4 From Edwin L. Palmer, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 57 Vt. Rep.
5 'From F. K. Conover, Esq., Rep. ; will probably appear in 63 or 64 Wis. Rep.
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contrary to public policy only, will be estopped from setting up the sup-
posed illegality of such contract in defence to an action by his principal
to recover the money in his hands: Taylor v. Pells, 113 Ill.
In this case a person, as the agent of a firm of contractors for the
construction of a railroad, procured subscriptions for the purpose of se-
curing the location of a depot at a certain point on the road, in which
those who made the subscriptions were interested, the contractors having
the power, under the terms of their arrangement with the railroad com-
pany, to fix the location of the depot at the place desired. The agent
who thus procured the subscriptions was at the time a director in the
railroad company, and, having applied the proceeds of the subscriptions
to his own use, in a suit by his principals to recover from him the money
so obtained, he set up the supposed illegality of the contract resulting
from his official relation to the railroad company, as a defence ; but it
was held, he was estopped from relying upon such defence as against
his principals: Id.
ASSiNiMENT. See Attachment.
Tort-Right of Assignee to Sue.-A cause of action for the obstruc-
tion of a navigable river was assigned absolutely in consideration of the
assignee applying the net proceeds of the claim to the payment of cer-
tain debts of the assignors and paying any overplus to such assignors:
Held, that the assignee might maintain the action in his own name:
Gates v. .Borthern Pacific Railroad, 63 or 64 Wis.
ATTACHMENT.
.fflect of-Assignment intervening between two Attachments.-After a
debtor to a defendant in attachment had been garnished by a creditor
of the defendant, the latter transferred and assigned his claim or demand
to another creditor, and notice of the transfer was given to the debtor,
when a second creditor in attachment against the same defendant gar-
nished the same debtor, and both suits proceeded to judgment at the
same term. The funds in the hands of the garnishee were not sufficient
to satisfy the two judgments, and the court ordered the same to be ap-
portioned between the two judgment creditors to the exclusion of the
assignee of the debt owing by the garnishee: field, that the court
decided in accordance with the law : Reeve v, Smith, 113 Ill.
A chose in action is not assignable, either at common law or under our
statute, so as to vest the legal title in the assignee. Such assignee will
take the same subject to all defences that existed against the assignor.
He stands in the shoes of his assignor, and can claim no greater rights
in the demand assigned than could his assignor: Id.
ATTORNEY.
Privileged Communications.-Where two parties go together to an
attorney, and make statements to him in the presence of each other,
such statements are not confidential communications intended to be
withheld from the opposite party, and there is no error in permitting the
attorney to testify thereto in a suit between the partiez, relating to the
subject-matter of such communications: Lnn v. Lyerle, 113 Ill.
BAILMENT.
Shilment of Goods without Order-Delivery to Carrier-Consignor and
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Consignee-Lien of Factor-Assumpsit- Trover-.feasure of Damages.
-Where goods have been shipped to one who has not ordered them,
title does not pass to the consignee by delivery to the carrier, and the
right to change the consignment and destination during the transporta-
tion remains in the shipper: Buhl v. Corner, 63 Md.
If the factor have claims for advances against his principal, and it be
expressly agreed that goods shall be shipped to the factor to pay those
advances, the law makes the delivery to the carrier a delivery to the
consignee, though a factor. But such is not the case where there is no
agreement or mutual assent on the part of the consignor and consignee
to that effect at the time of the shipment of the goods : Id.
If the factor receives a consignment of goods for sale, while the goods
are still the property of the consignor, the lien of the factor for previ-
ous advances to the consignor will at once attach, and the consignor will
have to pay the advances in order to release the goods: Id.
But if while the goods are in transitu and at his risk, the consignor
parts with the title, the goods are no longer his, and the lien of his thc-
tor will not attach, although the goods actually come into his possession:
Id.
C. was a commission merchant in Baltimore, to whom M. in Minne-
sota had, prior to the month of January 1882, made consignments of
-,flour for sale upon commission. On the" 21st of January 1882, M.,
without any order from C., consigned to him a car load of flour for sale.
No bill of lading was sent to U.; but M. advised him of the shipment
by letter, and named a price at which he should sell. At the time of
the shipment, M. was indebted to C. on account of advances made upon
previous shipments, but it did not appear that he knew, or that C. had
informed him of the state of the accounts between them. While the
goods were in transit, M. sold the flour to R. in Baltimore, and had the
bill of lading made out in R.'s name, and gave the carriers the necessary
instructions for having the flour delivered to R., at Baltimore, instead
of to C. Through a failure to carry out these instructions, the flour
was delivered to C., by whom it was sold. In an action of assumpsit
brought by R. against C., it was hebl: 1st. That the property in the
flour had vested in R., who was entitled to maintain the action. 2d.
That R. having sued in assumpsit, and not in trover, he was only entitled
to recover for the money received from the sale of the flour: Id.
CoMMoN CARRIER. See Negligence.
Railroad-Passenger iding in dangerous place- Contributory Negli-
gence.-Plaintiff's intestate, who, in pursuance of a contract for the car-
riage of horses, and in accordance with the custom in such cases, was
riding in the same car with the horses in order to care for them, was
killed in a collision caused by defendant's gross negligence. Held, that
he would not, as an ordinary passenger who had voluntarily placed him-
self in a dangerous position, be deemed to have been guilty of con-
tributory negligence : Lawson v. C., St. P., .. & 0. Ry. Co., 63 or 64
Wis.
Where it is customary for some person to ride in the same car with
horses, to care for them, it would seem to be within the general author-
ity of the conductor of the train to grant permission to a person so to
ride for that purpose : .d.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Impairing Obligation of Contract- Charter of Cororation-Altera-
tion of Proceedings as to Land Damages.-The rule that the legislature
does not impair the obligation of a contract by limiting or altering the
modes of proceeding for enforcing it, provided the remedy be not with-
held or embarrassed with conditions or restrictions which impair the
value of the right, applies as well to irrepealable charters as to contracts
between individuals: State v. Weldon, 18 Vroom.
The charter of a railroad company, which was irrepealable, gave the
company the power to take lands by condemnation, and provided for an
appeal by the land-owner, fromn the award of damages, to a certain court:
Hebl, that a general statute which took away the right to appeal to chat
court, and gave an appeal to another court on the same terms and condi-
tions, and with the same mode of trial, was not unconstitutional : Id.
CRIMINAL LAW.
Gambling-Pool Selling.-The selling of pools on horse-races, and
the keeping of rooms where such pools are sold, do not constitute an
offence within the meaning of a statute which prohibits the keeping of
a gaming table or other place of gambling, and which declares that all
games, devices and contrivances at which money or any other thing shall
be bet or wagered, shall be deemed a gaming-table: James v. State, 63 Md.
Evidence- Competency of an Accused Party to Testify as to his In-
tent.-A person on trial for an assault with intent to murder, is compe*.
tent to testify as to the purpose for which he procured the instrument
with which he committed the assault: Fenwicc v. State, 63 Md.
Larceny What Constitutes at Common Law-Possession of Goods.-
At the common law there are three cases in which a conviction for
larceny may be sustained when the apparent possession is in the accused:
First, where the accused has the mere custody of' the property, as con-
tradistinguished from possession, as in the case of servants and the like :
second, where he obtains the custody and apparent possession by means
of fraud, or with the present purpose to steal the property; and third,
where one has acquired possession by a valid contract of bailment,
which is afterward terminated by some tortious act of the bailee, or
otherwise, whereby the possession reverts to the owner, leaving the cus-
tody, merely, with the former, and he feloniously converts the property
to his own use : Johnson v. The People, 113 Ill.
Larceny at the common law is defined to be " the felonious taking and
carrying away of the personal goods or property of another." Every
larceny at common law includes a trespass to personal property, and no
one lawfully in the possession of goods can commit a larceny of them at
common law: Rd.
Goods on the premises of the owner, to be used by himself and family
including his servants, are always deemed to be in the possession of the
owner, although the ordinary duties of the servants and other ruenebers
of the household require them, from time to time, to handle, occupy or
use them, or even to sell or dispose of them. So where chairs, beds,
&c., are occupied by a guest, whether in a hotel or private family, or
where plates or other articles are used by one at the table of another, or
where the owner delivers a chattel to another to be examined or used
for some temporary purcose in the presence of the owner, the same rule
VOL. XXXIII.-94
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
applies. In all such cases the possession remains with the owner, and
those having the temporary use or occupancy are deemed to have only
the mere custody, and a felonious taking of the same by them is lar-
ceny : 1d.
But when the owner of a chattel delivers it to one, other than a mere
servant, in trust, upon a contract that the latter will faithfully execute
the trust, the rule is different. In such case, which is an ordinary bail-
ment, the possession as well as the custody passes to the bailee with its
delivery, and while the bailment exists the bailee cannot, by the com-
mon law, commit a larceny of the chattels : 11L
Where the possession is not fairly and honestly obtained, as when
there is an original purpose on the part of the bailee to steal the pro-
perty, and the bailment is a mere pretence on his part td hide a felonious
intent, the possession will not pass; and if the property is subsequently
converted in pursuance of such criminal purpose, it will be larceny, by
the common law: Id.
Where the owner intends to part both with the title and possession,
and the property is delivered in pursuance of such intention, the person
receiving it cannot be convicted of larceny, although the transfer was
induced by- the fraud of the latter, and with a purpose to steal the pro-
perty: Id.
Evidence-Bastardy-Exhibiton of Child in Court.-In bastardy
proeeedings the bastard child may not be exhibited to the jury for the
purpose of showing by its likeness to the defendant that it is his child:
Ranawalt v. State, 63 or 64 Wis.
Assault and Battery-Evidence-.Partcipation.-Where the assault
and battery complained of were part of one preconcerted affray, evi-
dence of the circumstances of other fights engaged in by the defendants
in the execution of their unlawful purpose, is admissible: Rhinehart v.
Whitehead, 63 or 64 Wis.
A person who goes to a place with others with the intent to get up a
fight with persons there, may be liable for an assault and battery com-
mitted in the execution of that purpose, although he did not actually
participate in such assault: Id.
- DAMAGES. See Bailment; Negligence; Pleading.
X,<Death -Statutory Action by Next of Kin-Nature and Measure of
'Damages.-Damages recoverable for the death of any person are limited
by the statute to such as arise from pecuniary injury, resulting from the
death, to the widow and next of kin: Demarest v. Little, 18 Yroom.
Injury received by some of the next of kin, by the dissolution of a
partnership relation between them and deceased, is not within the scope
of the statute: Id.
Injury claimed to arise by the deprivation of such services and coun-
sel as a father might probably give to his children, must be limited to
such services and counsel as would be of pecuniary advantage, and must
be determined with careful reference to the age, condition and relations
of the parties: Id.
Where the injury claimed is the deprivation of the probability of re-
ceiving such probable accumulations as deceased might have made if
he had' continued in life, income derivable from funds invested, and
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which the next of kin have received, should not be taken into account,
and due weight must be given to contingencies which might diminish
the probable accumulations or divert them from the next of kin : Id.
DEBTORL AND CREDITOR. See Ekbecution; Sale.
DEED.
Constructon.-B., being the owner in fee of a tract of land, conveyed
to his mother an undivided third part of it during her widowhood. Sub-
sequently B. and his wife conveyed the same land to W. by a deed, the
granting clause of which states that the grantors did thereby convey
"unto the said J. W., his heirs and assigns, all their estate, right, title
and interest, trust property or claim and demand whatsoever at law or
in equity of them, the said S. A. B., and N., his wife, of, in and to, the
following described parts of tracts or parcels of land. * * * It is un-
derstood by the parties herein mentioned, that the interest herein con-
veyed is the two-thirds of the above described land :" Held, that this
deed only conveyed to W. a two-thirds interest in the land described:
Zittle v. Weller, 63 Nd.
The rule which requires a deed to be construed most strongly against
the grantor, is to be resorted to and relied on only when all other rules
of exposition fail to reach with reasonable certainty the intention of the
parties: Id.
The rule that where there are two contradictory or repugnant clauses
in a deed the first clause shall prevail over the latter, has no application
to a case where the supposed contradiction is between parts of the same
clause: Id.
DEVISE.
Catholic Bisho2p-Religious Corporation-Equitable Conversion.-A.
devised unto B., a Catholic bishop, in his individual capacity, all the
real and personal property owned by the testator at his death, in trust
that upon the request of a certain religious congregation, the trustee
would sell the property, either at public or private sale, and apply the
proceeds to the erection or maintenance, or both, of an orphan asylum,
under the direction of, and as requested by such congregation : Held,
that this was not a devise of real estate to a religious corporation, but
to an individual as a trustee, and is not prohibited by any statute or
law of this state : Germain v. Baltes, 11' Ill.
Where a testator devised all his real and personal estate to one as a
trustee, to be sold and converted into money when so requested by an
incorporated religious society, and applied in establishing an orphan
asylum, to be udider the direction and control of such society, it was
held, that the devise in favor of the charity was a devise of money and
not of land, and was such as the courts will uphold: Id.
EVIDENCE. See Criminal Law.
Lease- Unsigned Memorandum of Terms-Res gest.-In the course
of a negotiation for a lease, a paper was partly written by the defend-
ant and handed by him to the plaintiff, and by him interlined and re-
turned to the defendant, which paper was not signed by either of the
parties. On the trial the question was whether the terms of the lease
were those mentioned in the paper only, or there were other terms agreed
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upon outside of it: Held, that this paper, although unsigned, was ad-
missible in evidence as part of the res gestm: Freeman v. Bartlett, 18
Vroom.
EXECUTION.
Riempt Property-Fraudulent Purchase of by Debtor.-An insolvent
debtor who sells property which is subject to levy on execution, and
with the proceeds immediately purchases exempt property, will be pre-
sumed to have done so with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his cred-
itors ; but 'the property so purchased does not, for that reason, cease to
be exempt. The only remedy of the creditors is by attacking the sale
of the non-exempt property: Comstock v. Bechtel, 63 or 64 Wis.




What are-Remedy for Removal.-Boards in a corn barn, used for a
permanent floor, and stone posts, deposited upon the farm for the pur-
pose and with the intention of building necessary fences, could not law-
fully be sold as personalty by an officer on the extent: Hackett v. .Ams-
den, 57 Vt.
Trespass de bonis is the proper form of action to recover for the boards
and posts ; as the claim was, not for breaking and entering, but for tak-
ing and carrying away: Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See Insurance.
Action-Promise of Husband to repay Mone?.s received from Wife-
Promise of EBecutors.-A suit at law will not lie on a promise of a hus-
band to repay to his wife moneys received by him for her during cover-
ture; Rusling v. Rusling, 18 Vroom.
But such suit will lie against the executors of the husband on a pro-
mise made by them officially to pay the moneys so received by the hus-
band: Id.
-,Feme Covert-Personal Tort-Joinder of Husband and Wife- Gen-
1 Demurrer.-A feme covert brought suit for a personal tort, by her
,et friend. It appeared on the face of the declaration that she had a
husband living. On general demurrer to the declaration, it was held,
1st. That the suit should have been brought in the names of the hus-
band and wife jointly; 2d. That as the defect appeared upon the face
of the declaration, advantage could be taken of it by general demur-
rer: Treusch v. Kamke, 18 Vroom.
LANDLORD AND TENANT. See Nuisance.
MORTGAGE.
Chattel Mortgage-- Certainty of Description-Chattels to be consumed
for Benefit of Mortgagee.-The description of property in a chattel
mortgage as 'Forty-one Berkshire hogs and sixty-five grain sacks," is
not so uncertain as to invalidate the mortgage: Knapp v. Deitz, 63 or
64 Wis.
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A mortgage of chattels furnished by the mortgagee to the mortgagor
and to be used and consumed by 'him for the benefit of the mortgagee,
is not void as to the creditors of the mortgagor: Id.
Animals-Increase-Bona Fide Purchaser.-Where domestic ani-
mals are mortgaged during the period of gestation, the offspring when
born will, as between the parties to the mortgage, he covered thereby;
but as against a bona fide purchaser or encumbrancer acquiring his title
or lien without notice of the facts and after the period of nurture has
passed, such off.spring will not be covered by the mortgage: Sunk v.
Paul, 63 or 64 Wis.
One who takes a mortgage of chattels to secure a pre-existing debt
which is not yet due, and without any new consideration, is not entitled
to protection as a bona fide purchaser or encumbrancer: Id.
Improper Filing-Rights of Mortgagee to Insurance Money as against
Attachments.-A mortgagee of chattels which are insured by a policy
providing that the loss shall be payable to him as his interest may ap-
pear, is entitled to the insurance money to the amount of the mortgage
debt, as against creditors of the mortgagor garnishing the insurance
company after a loss, although the mortgage was not properly filed:
.awson v. Pheni x ins. Co., 63 or 64 Wis.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
Council--S-eating of Member- Conclusiveness of First Investigation.-
The common council of a city, made by the charter the sole judge of the
election and qualifications of its own members, having once investigated
and seated a member, cannot, at a subsequent meeting, order a second
investigation : State v. City Council of Camden., 18 Vroom.
NEGLIGENCE. See Common Carrier.
Opening in Sidewalk- Contributory Negligence-Damages-Eidence.
-For an injury resulting from a fall into an opening in the sidewalk of
a public street, communicating with a cellar of the adjoining building,
and left without guard or notice of danger, the owner and occupier
of the premises is liable: Houston v. Traphagen, 18 Vroom.
Whether the injured person contributed to the injury by his negli-
gence depends on the circumstances; and where it appeared that he
stepped into the unguarded opening while his attention was attracted
by objects in a shop window above the opening, the plaintiff should
not be nonsuited, and a verdict in his favor should not be disturbed:
Id.
When it is claimed that the fall produced or excited disease, it should
appear, in order to recover damages for the results of the disease, not
only that the fall was a possible cause of the disease, but other causes
should be sq excluded and the circumstances should be such as to leave
a reasonable inference that the fall was the actual cause: Id.
Ferry-boat-Passing Ashore in Orowd.-A person who, in passing
from a ferry-boat to the dock, puts himself in so dense a crowd that he
cannot see to his footing, and in that situation gets his foot crushed
between the boat and the dock, has no cause of action against the ferry
company, as his own, negligence has been contributory to the injury:
Dwyer v. N. Y., L. E. & W. Ry. Co., 18 Vroom.
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NUISANCE.
Liability of Landlord-Stipulation of Tenant to Repair.-lHe who
creates a nuisance on his own premises cannot escape liability for its
continuaiee by demising the premises whereon the nuisance is: Inywer-
senv. Rankin, 18 Vroom.
Such liability will exist although the tenant by his demise stipulates
to keep the premises in repair: Id.
A landlord whose tenant during the term has created a nuisance on
the demised premises will not be liable therefor so long as he has no
right of entry or power to abate; but when the term expires, or the
landlord may enter and abate the nuisance, he will become liable for its
c6ntinuance, and that liability cannot be evaded by i renewal of the
lease, though with covenants to repair and without the landlord's having
taken actual possession: .d.
Quiere. Whether knowledge of the existence of the nuisance is neces-
sary to establish the landlord's liability in such cases: Id.
PARENT AND CHILD.
Support of Child-Allowance out of his Estate.-The parents of an
infant child lived apart, and the mother supported it both before and
after lands were devised to it. Upon the death of the child the parents
became its sole heirs: Held, that in equity the mother was entitled to
an allowance out of the child's estate for the amount expended by her
upon its support. TAYLOR, J., dissents: Pierce v. Pierce, 63 or 64
Wis.
PARTNERSHIP.
Agency-.eeution by one Partner of Sealed Instrument.-A partner
cannot bind his copartner by warrant of attorney under his hand and
seal in the name of the firm where there has been no previous consent
or authority given or subsequent ratification: Ellis v. Ellis, 18 Vroom.
PAYMENT. See Usury.
PLEADING.
Actionfor Tort-Damages.-In an action for a personal tort, the
mount of the damages claimed must be laid in the declaration; and if
~damages are laid the defect will be fatal on general demurrer: Treusch,
Kamke, 63 Md.
The amount of the damages claimed in such case is a jurisdictional
fact. If the amount exceed $100, the Court of Common Pleas has juris-
diction, if it be less than $100, a justice of the peace has exclusive
jurisdiction : Id.
RAILROAD. See Common Carrier.
SALE.
Change of Possession-Exception to Rule-Fraud in Law.-A sale
of saw logs piled on land so low and wet that it was impossible to remove
them, only on frozen ground, without the cost exceeding the value of
the logs, is valid against attaching creditors, without a change of pos-
session : Kingsley v. White, 57 Vt.
But, if a change of possession had been necessary, it was held, that
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the facts, that the vendor had sold and conveyed the lot to a third
party by a deed with only one witness to it, that such third party, the
vendor and the purchaser, with his attorney, went on to the lot, and
marked the logs with 'the purchaser's initials, the third party agreeing
to take care of them for him, did not constitute a sufficient change of
possession, as it was not found-and the court could not infer it-that
the third party was in open, visible possession of the lot: id.
SET-OFPP.
Judgments-Decree in Admiralt.-A decree in admiralty in favor
of a libellant, on a libel for damages in a federal court, may be set off
against a judgment recovered in this court against the libellant, the




Joint Sureties-Separate Bonds-Different Conditions.-The rule
that if one of two joint sureties for an insolvent principal holds collat-
eral the other is entitled to share in it, does not apply where the sure-
ties are on separate bonds to secure a faithful discharge of duty on the
part of the principal acting in differents capacities, first as guardian of
an insane ward, and then on the ward's death, as administrator of her
estate, when the collateral was not given as security for signing the
bond, but for signing as surety certain bank notes; and this is so,
although, after it was claimed that the principal was in default, the sure-
ties entered into a written agreement to join in defence and share equally
in the liability; and the defendant realized more out of the collateral
than he was compelled to pay on said notes: Somers v. Johnson,
57 Vt.
SURETY. See Subrogation.
Surrender of Security offered in lieu of Note.-The orators were
sureties on a note, and the defendant the payee. The principal at-
tempted to induce the payee to accept his own note secured by a mort-
gage on a lot of land owned by him in lieu of his note with said sure-
ties; and the payee took the mortgage into his possession, and agreed
to exchange, if on examination he should find the title clear of encum-
brance. On being informed by the town clerk that there was an undis-
charged mortgage on the land he refused to exchange, and returned the
mortgage to the principal, although the surety requested him to hold it.
It turned out afterwards, that the land was clear. A bill having been
brought to restrain the payee from collecting the note; held, that the
rule, that the voluntary surrender by a creditor of security pledged by
the principal for the debt discharges the surety, does not apply, and
that the bill should be dismissed: Adams v. Dutton, 57 Vt.
Notes of Evidence- Variance- Question for Jury-Testimony of
Attorney.-When an official reporter is not present at a trial to take
down the exact words-the court having made no migutes-and counsel
disagree as to what a witness said on a matter material to the issue, it is
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not only proper for the court to submit the question to the jury, but it
is his duty to do so; and this is so, although the defendant moved for a
nonsuit on the ground of variance: Porter v. Platt, 57 Vt.
In such a case, the testimony of an attorney with his minutes taken
on trial, is not admissible to strengthen or weaken that of a witness
given on the same trial: Id.
TRoVER.
Property obtained by Fraud.-The title to property does not pass
when possession is obtained by fraud; thus, the defendant falsely repre-
senting himself to be one of a firm of produce commission merchants in
Boston, induced the plaintiff to send poultry to said firm to be sold on
commission, with the fraudulent purpose of obtaining it without paying
for it : Held, that the property did not pass, and that trover would lie
for the conversion: McC rillis v. Allen, 57 Vt.
USURY.
Mortgages-Relief in Equity- Application of Payments.-The P. L.
Co. held three mortgages made by D. of different dates. Usurious in-
terest was paid on the two elder mortgages, and they were overpaid, the
aggregate payments exceeding the amount of the principal with legal
interest thereon. More than three years after the last payments made
thereon, D. filed a bill for the redemption of all three mortgages, and
for an account, and asked that the amount overpaid on the first two
mortgages -by reason of the usurious interest exacted, should be applied
in reduction of the sum due on the third mortgage. On limitations
pleaded in bar of the right to an account, it was held, that it'being con-
ceded that there had been an application of payments already made by
agreement of the parties to the first two mortgages, those payments could
not by mere operation of law be afterwards transferred to the subsequent
debt created by the last mortgage: Dickey v. Permanent Land Co.,
63 Md.
The rule in regard to the application of payments is well defined. At
the time when payment is made, there may be an application by agree-
ment between the debtor and creditor. If there be no such agreement
the debtor may make the application; and in the absence of any action
on/his part, the creditor may apply the money to the extinguishment of
claim which he has against the debtor. If there has been no ap-
lication by parties, the law will apply the payment in conformity with
established and recognised rules : -d.
But the law never makes an application of payment when the parties
have already done so. And this rule governs even in the case of an
application of money to the payment of an item in an account current
which is not recoverable in an action at law: Id.
VESSEL.
Joint Owners- Conversion.-One joint owner of a vessel cannot
maintain an action against his co-owner for a conversion thereof, except
in case of a total destruction, or something equivalent thereto, through
the fault of such co-owner. The fact that the co-owner has negligently
damaged the vessel, or has run it into debt and created liens upon it
beyond its value, is not sufficient: Alderson v. Schulze, 63 or 64 Wis.
